Measuring Agriculture Abundance: Buy outcomes, not looks or effort

As I described in the first part of this series, agriculture satisfies multiple levels of needs. Our agriculture system is quite good at measuring what satisfies the lower levels of those needs (mainly calories and protein), but it rarely measures nutrients or environmental benefits. If we can do a better job measuring–or modeling–those results, it’s likely that more will be produced: more nutritious carrots and more clean water.

We’re producing what we measure and not producing what we don’t.

Most key ag commodities get graded and priced on a set of measured qualities, like damage and foreign material, and instruments may measure the macronutrients inside. Those results move the price up or down against a schedule of premiums and discounts. 

Wheat is a good example of this. At the grain elevator, federal inspectors check the density of a bushel and look for kernel damage, while a near-infrared analyzer reads protein content, and the buyer adds or subtracts cents per bushel based on the results. The premiums are large enough to change how wheat is grown. In 2017, which was a low protein year, Kansas City buyers quoted wheat with 13% protein45 cents above 12%, $1.10 above 11%, and $2 above ordinary wheat with no protein guarantee. At that spread, protein can decide whether a field makes money, so growers choosing varieties and adjusting fertilizer management to maximize profit often end up producing more protein.

Similarly, after USDA changed federal milk pricing from paying farmers mainly for the volume of milk they shipped to paying them for the pounds of butterfat, protein, and other solids in the milk, the butterfat percentage rose 16% and protein climbed 8% in the past fifteen years. 

Fruits and vegetables are measured against some criteria too, but theirs are overwhelmingly physical like color, size, shape, firmness, maturity, uniformity, and freedom from defects. As a result, the school cafeteria’s tasteless apples sure do look better than ever. 

There are almost no criteria anywhere in the fresh or processed vegetable standards for vitamins/minerals/phytonutrients. A small handful of standards use chemical composition beyond fat and protein, such as sugar in tomatoes and the sugar to acid ratio in citrus. USDA’s olive oil standard, for example, uses free fatty acid, peroxide value, UV absorbency, and fatty-acid composition as mandatory tests, which probably relate to long-term health. But these are the exceptions and not exactly what we’re looking for. 

It’s hard not to think that–just as measuring butterfat led to more butterfat–not measuring the iron in collard greens might be responsible for losing 81% of it between 1975 and 1997. Conversely, developing better (cheap, quick, noninvasive) tools for measuring vegetable nutrients and implementing marketing standards could encourage farmers to produce foods that satisfy more of the second tier of needs for long-term health.

I’ll freely admit that I’m not a dietitian or expert in measuring plant nutrients, and so I’m not entirely sure how we should conduct those measurements and convey them to consumers. I feel reasonably confident this is a helpful framework, but I’d welcome disagreement from the people who are more knowledgeable than I. Where I am absolutely sure that more measurement would get us more outcomes is in conservation.

We’re not producing conservation results.

Decades of conservation spending has not delivered the clean water and other conservation outcomes that were intended. In the Gulf, the Hypoxia Task Force first aimed to shrink the dead zone to 1,900 square miles by 2015, then pushed the deadline to 2035. The five-year average still stands at 4,755 square miles, more than twice the target–despite over 40 years of effort. The Chesapeake Bay tells the same story. The region missed its 2025 nutrient goals, its third missed deadline after 2000 and 2010, and is resetting its targets to 2040--and most of the remaining reductions need to come from agriculture. The same story can be told for other geographies, like the Great Lakes, and other outcomes, like soil loss. 

These misses do not come solely from a lack of money. EQIP alone has distributed billions of dollars a year since its authorization in 1996. As the Chesapeake Bay program’s comprehensive evaluation put it in 2023, “Additional funding of existing implementation efforts is unlikely to produce the intended nutrient reduction outcomes.” We need to improve how the money is spent. The dominant method of funding on-farm conservation, cost-share, pays for the expected cost of installing an approved practice, not for the pollution it keeps out of the water. So, it pays the same rate where a practice works well and where it barely works at all. It pays the same rate where a farmer really wants to do the practice and where they need a big incentive to do so. The system is organized around effort rather than results. 

The model is also built for an agency that has been hollowed out. Every cost-share contract requires NRCS staff to plan, design, certify, and check practices farm by farm. Staffing at environmental agencies is unlikely to recover to historical levels, and discretionary budgets will be tighter. Doing more of the same with fewer people and potentially less money will not close the implementation gap. A smaller NRCS has to choose to stop contracting practice by practice and to spend its people on what only government can do: setting standards, pricing outcomes, and paying for results.

The fix for inadequate conservation is simply to pay for the result we actually want. 

Instead of reimbursing the installation of one practice from a big list, the government should pay per unit of quantified environmental outcome: pounds of nitrogen or phosphorus kept out of a watershed, tons of carbon sequestered, biodiversity restored, etc. Let farmers (directly or through aggregators) choose how to hit the target; let payment come after delivery; let a market reward the most effective approaches.

In practice, this most often means a program to which farmers or their partners apply by stating the practice(s) they intend to implement, how much of the outcome will be generated (based on a model), and the price they’d need to be paid to do so. Applications are evaluated based primarily on the cost per unit of outcomes. And because payment doesn’t occur until the outcomes are achieved, the applicants don’t have to document their process or accounting. And when the applicant is a conservation nonprofit or an engineering firm working with a farmer, the applicant and the farmer can work out what’s the most compelling incentive for the farmer to generate the results.

USDA economists have estimated for decades that this is dramatically more cost-effective, and state-level research is beginning to prove that in practice. Outcomes-based conservation also makes it possible to produce much more environmental improvement with less staff, because the technical assistance work typically done by government is offloaded to the private sector. And many farmers prefer this because it’s less paperwork for them.

Most importantly, paying for outcomes rather than practices attracts private investment to develop better conservation techniques and technology. Once there is a consistent demand signal with a price paid for removing a pound of nitrogen from a river, someone has a reason to invent a cheaper way to do it. For instance, a company that applied to Virginia’s Pay for Outcomes program is developing a novel filter that captures ammonia gas from chicken houses before it can deposit nitrogen in waterways.

Thankfully, the Chief of NRCS, the federal government’s largest conservation agency, has named “shift towards outcomes-based conservation and farmer empowerment” as his #2 priority. Now, it comes time to actually implement that. 

Here are 10 different ways to actually make the shift:

  1. Select all possible Regional Conservation Partnership Program awards to be for projects that make what the program calls “performance-based payments,” essentially buying environmental outcomes via third-parties. To make even more of these awards, USDA could ask Congress to remove the statutory cap that allows only 15 Alternative Funding Arrangements per year.

  2. Direct the Conservation Effects Assessment Project, with support from the Office of Environmental Markets, to model the outcomes that all legacy conservation programs are generating and the per-unit cost to produce them, so that they can be compared to outcomes-based programs and markets at the state and federal level, similar to EPIC’s recent research in Wisconsin.

  3. Set standards for the outcomes USDA is most interested in purchasing, as judged by how common they are, ease of quantification, likelihood of success, and private-sector demand. These standards can often be borrowed from markets already making transactions, such as Volumetric Water Benefit Accounting.

  4. Create an internal and external working group that develops a new set of forms to distinguish outcomes-based work from practice-based work and builds a process for it to succeed. Start by mapping the paperwork: follow a few outcomes-based projects start to finish, discuss the requirements with USDA staff, and watch for the steps applicants never see coming. The goal is a streamlined pathway and a clear trigger that puts projects onto it. Without that separate track, outcomes-based conservation will languish in the red tape that has bedeviled it for two decades.

  5. One part of streamlining outcomes-based conservation can be reducing the burden of environmental evaluations on outcomes-based projects. Currently, the programmatic environmental assessment for RCPP limits performance-based payments to only outcomes generated by USDA-certified practices. One option would be to issue a Chief's memorandum clarifying that outcome-based payments are exempt from NEPA without a categorical exclusion, because they’re purchases of goods. 

  6. Provide block grants to states already buying outcomes from farmers to increase the size of their programs, like Vermont’s Pay for Phosphorus program, or to make large purchases from water quality and carbon trading marketplaces within the state.

  7. Use Commodity Credit Corp (and SUSTAINS Act) authorities to create a “National Outcomes Bank” that buys verified environmental outcomes from farmers and aggregates them for sale to voluntary and compliance buyers.

  8. Grassland CRP pays ranchers a flat rental rate plus up to 50% cost-share for infrastructure, but ties neither payment to whether the land actually improves; meanwhile BLM conditions rental contracts on land improvement outcomes. The NRCS Chief could redirect those cost-share dollars into a voluntary outcomes-based incentive modeled on BLM's Outcome-Based Grazing program that would pay ranchers on a sliding scale for verified progress toward land-health benchmarks. 

  9. Outside of USDA, Congress could reauthorize the Treasury Department’s Social Impact Partnerships Pay for Results Act and explicitly include environmental outcomes in its mandate.

  10. Create a new Congressionally authorized conservation program that pays farmers solely based on meeting metrics of biodiversity conservation and restoration, similar to Ireland's ACRES or Switzerland's Biodiversity Contributions programs. 

These suggestions range from the “implementable tomorrow” to a wholesale change in how billions of dollars are spent. But the time has come to start making progress on this priority if we want to see an abundance of clean water and healthy air.


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LSL Policy Lowdown: November 9–15, 2026